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A novel account of how the law contributes to the
insecurity of our data and a bold way to rethink it.
Digital connections permeate our lives—and so do data breaches.
It is alarming how difficult it is to create rules for securing our
personal information. Despite the passage of many data security
laws, data breaches are increasing at a record pace. In Breached!,
Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog, two of the world's leading
experts on privacy and data security, argue that the law fails
because, ironically, it focuses too much on the breach itself.
Drawing insights from many fascinating stories about data
breaches, Solove and Hartzog show how major breaches could
have been prevented or mitigated through a different approach to
data security rules. Current law is counterproductive. It pummels
organizations that have suffered a breach but doesn't address the
many other actors that contribute to the problem: software
companies that create vulnerable software, device companies that
make insecure devices, government policymakers who write
regulations that increase security risks, organizations that train
people to engage in risky behaviors, and more.
Although humans are the weakest link for data security, policies
and technologies are often designed with a poor understanding of
human behavior. Breached! corrects this course by focusing on the
human side of security. Drawing from public health theory and a
nuanced understanding of risk, Solove and Hartzog set out a
holistic vision for data security law-one that holds all actors
accountable, understands security broadly and in relationship to
privacy, looks to prevention and mitigation rather than reaction,
and works by accepting human limitations rather than being in
denial of them. The book closes with a roadmap for how we can
reboot law and policy surrounding data security.
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Praise for Breached!
“An exceptionally insightful and
accessible overview of key data
security challenges and the law’s
dysfunctional attempts to deal with
them.”
– Edward McNicholas, Global
Cybersecurity Practice Co-Leader,
Ropes & Gray

“A readable and smart account of how
policymakers keep focusing on the
wrong details at the expense of the
bigger picture. Breached! is a book for
anyone who is interested in why data
breaches keep happening and what
the law should do about it.”
– Bruce Schneier, author of Click Here
to Kill Everybody

“Breached! shows how the future of
data security requires us to look at the
problem holistically and understand
that good privacy rules can also
promote good security outcomes. A
breath of fresh air on an important and
often-ignored topic.”
– Neil Richards, Professor of Law,
Washington University

“A fascinating exploration of the ways
that our fixation on individual data
breaches has limited the effectiveness
of data security law.”
– Josephine Wolff, Associate
Professor of Cybersecurity Policy,
Tufts University

“[A] foundational contribution to data
security law. With deep insight,
compelling storytelling, and even
humor (and some needed fright), the
scholars show that lawmakers must
better understand that beneath the
high-tech wizardry and data security
do's and don'ts are normal, fallible
people. This book is a must read for
everyone concerned about the
security of our personal data."
-- Danielle Keats Citron,
Distinguished Professor, University
of Virginia School of Law

“A compelling account of where data
security law has gone wrong plus
convincing advocacy of where it
should go. This book should be read
by anyone involved in privacy and
cybersecurity.”
– Paul Schwartz, Jefferson E.
Peyser Professor of Law,
Berkeley Law School

“A clear, accessible, persuasive case
that data security today needs a
systematic approach, far beyond just
mopping up breaches. I hope every
regulator or legislator working on the
subject reads this book and follows
their advice.”
– William McGeveran, Associate
Dean for Academic Affairs,
U. Minnesota Law School
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ometimes the thing we are looking for is right in front of us and
yet we still don’t see it. A great novella by Gabriel Garcia Marquez
called Chronicle of a Death Foretold begins with the vicious fatal
stabbing of the main character. The rest of the story reveals that all the
warning signs about the murder were in plain sight yet ignored by everyone. The murder was readily preventable—but, because of human nature, it was almost inevitable.
The story of most data breaches follows the same pattern. We have read
about thousands of data breaches, and the moral of most of these stories
boils down to the same thing: The breaches were preventable, but people
made blunders. What is quite remarkable about these stories is that they
haven’t evolved that much in decades. The same mistakes keep happening
again and again. After so many years, and so many laws to regulate data
security, why haven’t the stories changed?
Let us begin with a classic data breach tale involving one of the largest
and most notable breaches of its time—the Target breach of 2013. The
story has many of the common themes of data breach stories, and what
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makes it particularly fascinating is that it is a sinister version of a David-
and-Goliath story. Target was Goliath, and it was well-fortified. With its
extensive resources and defenses, Target was far more protected than most
organizations. Yet, it still failed. This fact should send shivers down our
spines.
In mid-December 2013, right in the middle of the holiday shopping
season, executives at Target found out some dreaded news: Target had been
hacked. It was cruel irony that the second-largest discount store chain in
the United States quite literally had a target sign on it—Target’s logo is a red
and white bullseye. The hackers hit it with an arrow straight into the center.
Executives at Target learned about the breach from Department of
Justice officials, who informed them that stolen data from Target was
appearing online and that reports of fraudulent credit card charges were
starting to pop up.1 Quite concerned, the Target executives immediately
hired a forensics firm to investigate.
What they discovered was devastating. Target’s computer system had
been infected with malware, and there had been a data breach. It wasn’t
just a small breach, or a sizeable one, or even a big one—it was a breach
of epic proportions.2 Target had the dubious distinction of having suffered
the largest retail data breach in U.S. history.3
Over the course of two weeks starting in November 2013, hackers had
stolen detailed information for about 40 million credit and debit card
accounts, as well as personal information on about 70 million Target
customers.4 The hackers had begun to sell their tremendous data haul on
black-market fraud websites.
The timing couldn’t have been worse for Target. It suffered the single
largest decline of holiday transactions since it first began reporting the
statistic.5 Target sales plummeted during a season which traditionally accounts for 20 to 40 percent of a retailer’s annual sales.6 To stop the bleeding,
Target offered a 10 percent discount across the board. Nevertheless, the
damage was catastrophic. The company’s profits for the holiday shopping
period fell a whopping 46 percent.7
The pain was just beginning. On top of the lost profits, costs associated
with the breach topped $200 million by mid-February 2014. These costs
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would rise significantly due to bank reimbursement demands, regulatory
fines, and direct customer service costs.8 About 90 lawsuits were filed,
leading to massive lawyer bills.9
What made this all the more unnerving for Target is that it had devoted quite a lot of time and resources to its information security. Target
had more than 300 information security staff members. The company had
maintained a large security operations center in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
and had a team of security specialists in Bangalore that monitored its
computer network 24/7. In May 2013—just six months before the hack—
Target had implemented expensive and sophisticated malware detection
software from FireEye.10
With all this security—an investment of millions of dollars, state-of-
the-art security software, hundreds of security personnel, and round-the-
clock monitoring—how did Target fail?
A common narrative told to the public is that this entire debacle could
be traced to just one person who let the hackers slip in. In caper movies,
the criminals often have an inside guy who leaves the doors open. But
the person who let the hackers into Target wasn’t even a Target employee
and wasn’t bent on mischief. The person worked for Fazio Mechanical,
a Pennsylvania-based HVAC company, a third-party vendor hired by
Target. The Fazio employee fell for a phishing trick and opened an attachment in a fraudulent email the hackers had sent to him. Hidden in the
email attachment lurked the Citadel Trojan horse—a malicious software
program that took root in Fazio’s computers.11
The Citadel Trojan horse was nothing novel—it was a variant of a well-
known malware package called ZeuS and is readily detectable by any
major enterprise anti-virus software. But Fazio lacked the massive security infrastructure that Target had, allowing the malware to remain undetected on the Fazio computers. Through the Trojan horse, the hackers
obtained Fazio’s log-in credentials for Target’s system.
With access to Target, the hackers unleashed a different malware
program, one they bought on the black market for just a few thousand
dollars.12 Experts such as McAfee director Jim Walker characterized the
malware as “absolutely unsophisticated and uninteresting.”13
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At first, the malware went undetected, and it began compiling millions
of records during peak business hours. This data was being readied to
be transferred to the hackers’ location in Eastern Europe. But very soon,
FireEye flagged the malware and issued an alert. Target’s security team in
Bangalore noted the alert and notified the security center in Minneapolis.
But the red light was ignored.
FireEye flagged as many as five different versions of the malware. The
alerts even provided the addresses for the “staging ground” servers, and
a gaffe by the hackers meant that the malware code contained usernames
and passwords for these servers, meaning Target security could have
logged on and seen the stolen data for themselves.14 Unfortunately, the
alerts all went unheeded. Furthermore, given that several alerts were
issued before any data were actually removed from the Target systems,
FireEye’s automated malware deletion feature could have ended the assault without the need for any human action. However, the Target security
team had turned that feature off, preferring a final manual overview of
security decisions.15
With FireEye’s red lights blinking furiously, the hackers began moving
the stolen data on December 2, 2013. The malware continued to exfiltrate data freely for almost two weeks. Law enforcement officials from the
Department of Justice contacted Target about the breach on December
12, armed not only with reports of fraudulent credit card charges, but also
actual stolen data recovered from the dump servers, which the hackers
had neglected to wipe.16
The aftermath of the breach caused tremendous financial damage to
Target. It remains unknown what the precise cost of the breach was, but
an estimate in Target’s annual report of March 2016 put the figure at
$291 million.17 The company’s reputation was harmed. The CIO resigned.
For customers, there was increased risk of future fraud. Daily spending
and withdrawal limits had to be placed on many affected accounts, and
new credit cards had to be issued, causing consumers significant time loss
while updating their card information everywhere.18
The breach went down in the annals of data breach history—one for the
record books. But it would soon be overshadowed by even bigger breaches.
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On paper, the hackers never should have been able to breach Target. The
hackers used cheap methods, such as readily detectable malware that
wasn’t state-of-the-art. They were quite sloppy and made careless mistakes.
Target had much better technological tools and a large and sophisticated
team. It conducted phishing tests and employed forensic investigators. The
hackers were grossly outspent and outnumbered. Yet Target was still felled.
At first glance, it seems that Target’s Achilles’ heel was one employee
at one of its third-party vendors. Most large companies have hundreds of
third-party vendors. This person made just one wrong click of the mouse,
and that was all the hackers needed. Had that one person not clicked, then
a data breach leading to more than half-a-billion dollars might not have
occurred. That’s one very expensive mouse click!
However, a prolonged look reveals a host of systemic vulnerabilities. Although on a checklist Target looked healthy, it lost because one
key factor wasn’t accounted for—human behavior. Spending millions of
dollars and installing high-tech software still couldn’t prevent the humans
from their fateful blunders.
It doesn’t necessarily take technical wizardry or great skill to be a highly
successful criminal on the Internet. Technologies and data ecosystems are
so fragile and flawed that it is far too easy for hackers to break in. The
black market is overflowing with cybercrime start-up kits.19 Just download the tools and it’s off to the races. Because crime committed using the
Internet is rarely tracked down and enforced, in most cases, the fraudsters
get away with it.

WE HAVE MUCH TO LOSE

The stakes for data security are enormous. Data breaches, by which we
mean the unauthorized exposure, disclosure, or loss of personal information, are not only more numerous; they are more damaging. Every year,
millions of people are victimized by identity theft. Their personal data is
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used by fraudsters to impersonate them. Victims suffer because their credit
files become polluted with delinquent bills. Creditors go after victims for
the unpaid bills, and victims struggle to prove that the bills weren’t theirs.
Identity thieves also steal people’s identities to obtain medical care, and
this has resulted in people losing their health insurance. There are cases
where the police have arrested victims because their police records were
tainted by the identity thieves.
Ransomware attacks are rising dramatically. Ransomware works by
encrypting files on people’s computers so that the files are unreadable and
inaccessible. The data is held hostage. To get the data back, victims must
pay the hackers a ransom. Ransomware is incredibly profitable for hackers.
It is a frightening world where at any moment, all our computer files—our
documents, our precious photos and videos, our music, our most important information—can be held hostage for a ransom. In 2018, the city of
Atlanta, Georgia, spent $2.6 million to recover from a ransomware attack
on the city’s systems that asked for the rough equivalent of about $50,000
worth of the electronic currency Bitcoin.20
Malicious hackers can readily frame people when data is compromised.
They can put incriminating files onto people’s computers and then tip off
law enforcement authorities.21 Hackers can also access your most private
photos and writings and publish them to the world.22 They can take over
your computer and use it to spam other people or to serve as a conduit
through which to commit crimes.
As more devices, appliances, and vehicles are hooked up to the Internet,
physical safety is at grave risk.23 Hackers can break into our home devices.
They can peer at our children through our baby cameras. They can
snoop around through our home security cameras. They can listen in
on us through our home assistant devices. They can gain control of our
cars. They can also hack into implantable devices in our bodies, such as
pacemakers or insulin pumps.
As more and more of our sensitive data is maintained in vast dossiers
about us, as our biometric information is gathered and stored—such as
our fingerprints, eye scans, facial data, and DNA—what will the future
look like if organizations can’t keep it secure?
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In Minority Report, a 2002 movie based upon a short story by Philip
K. Dick, the protagonist John Anderton is on the run, being pursued exhaustively by the authorities. The movie is set in the future—2054—where
the government and businesses use extensive surveillance technologies.
To evade capture via ever-present retinal scanners, John must undergo an
operation to replace both of his eyes. The procedure is rather gruesome,
but it is necessary given the pervasive use of biometric identification in
the story.
Imagine the data breach notification letters of the future:

ve
rs
ity

We regret to inform you that we have suffered a breach, and hackers
have obtained your retinal data, which they could use to impersonate
you and gain access to accounts. To guard against future harm, we
recommend that you immediately schedule an operation to replace
your eyes.

U
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We are hurtling forward into a perilous future, with organizations
collecting more data and with the consequences of its misuse becoming
more dire—and even deadly.
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DATA SECURITY LAW’S GRAND ENTRANCE
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During the past two decades, policymakers have rushed out a body of law
to address the worsening data security nightmare. The most significant
development is the rise of data breach notification laws, which require
organizations that are breached to notify regulators, affected individuals,
and sometimes the media. Breach notification is immensely popular;
every state in America, as well as many countries, now have these laws.
Unfortunately, breach notification merely alerts victims that their data
was compromised in a breach. It doesn’t cure the harm; it just informs
people of the danger.
Then come the class action lawsuits. Sometimes mere hours after a
breach is made public, attorneys file lawsuits against companies on behalf
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of those whose data was compromised. Many of the suits fail. Others end
up settling, with companies paying to save on the cost of litigating the case.
Consumers often don’t receive any significant benefits or compensation.
In the Target case, the consumer lawsuits for the breach settled for a
pittance—just $10 million. The settlement was a fee paid not on the merits
of the case but to make it go away. The Target breach affected between 70
and 110 million individuals, which means that the recovery amounted to
just a few pennies per person.24 Victims did not see significant restitution
as the settlement only applied to the reimbursement of notoriously elusive “documented damages” and reimbursements for “lost time,” which is
often not given much value.
After breaches, regulators also step in to enforce, but many times
regulators take a pass. There are too many breaches each year, and
regulators only have the resources to go after a small fraction of them.
When regulators step in, their penalties often just increase the cost of
the breach to a small or modest degree. For example, a group of state
regulators settled with Target for $18.5 million.25 With the Target breach
costs at an estimated $291 million, this regulatory penalty represents less
than 10 percent of the total. Even if regulators or individual litigants were
to recover more in penalties and damages, it’s not clear that things would
be any different. Of course, greater monetary pain after a data breach might
provide a stronger incentive to keep data secure, but organizations already
face significant costs for breaches, and the additional incentive is not likely
going to be a game changer. Target was already taking security quite seriously and devoting significant resources to it. Target failed not because of a
lack of commitment to data security but because it made mistakes.
Breaches set in motion a series of legal responses that often drag on for
years and mire organizations in millions of dollars in expenses. By this
time, however, it is far too late. The damage has been done, and the law
mostly serves to heighten the expense to companies. While it is important
to make sure that organizations internalize the risks they create, the law
isn’t addressing all other actors that create risk. To make matters worse,
the law often fails to help individual victims whose data was compromised
in the breach.
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Despite data security law’s obsession with data breaches, the law
doesn’t seem to be reducing the size, severity, or number of breaches.
Data breaches are steadily increasing.26 The news is inundated with stories
about data breaches that were readily preventable through rather inexpensive, non-cumbersome means. Why aren’t data breaches slowing down?
Why doesn’t the law seem to be making any difference?
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This is a book about how to improve the law’s approach to data security.
Our goal is to reorient the way the law addresses actors who create and
participate in systems that leave personal information vulnerable to exposure and misuse.
Our book is not about cybersecurity in the broadest sense of the term,
which applies to all forms of security with systems that use the Internet.27
Instead, our focus is on data security, a significant piece of the cybersecurity
pie that involves personal data. Data security law is largely part of privacy,
data protection, and consumer protection frameworks like the Federal
Trade Commission’s (FTC) enforcement of rules against deceptive and
unfair trade practices, the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), statutes that govern entities using personal data like
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and
the law of torts that provides a remedy for negligent data practices.28
Although there is a lot of overlap between optimal regulation for data
security and cybersecurity, there are important differences. The risk
thresholds, threat modeling, actors affected, and type and magnitude of
harm can differ when personal data is involved rather than when supply
chains, machinery, or infrastructure are involved. It thus makes sense
in some contexts to treat data security as unique from other areas of
cybersecurity, and the law does so. Data security law emerges more from
privacy law than cybersecurity law.
Unfortunately, data security law currently exists in an awkward space between cybersecurity and privacy. Being in this space has been a detriment
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to data security law, which has often failed to incorporate the strengths
of both cybersecurity and privacy. Laws addressing privacy issues often
include data security as part of their framework. Because the legislative
lens is on privacy, legislators typically focus on the individual. Breach notification dominates data security law. The security rules are often vague
and sparse. In contrast, cybersecurity law frequently includes more robust
security rules based on systems-focused security frameworks.
In a cruelly ironic way, data security law also fails to draw strengths
from privacy law. Data security remains quite siloed from privacy. When
it is part of privacy laws, data security is often cabined to narrow sections.
Data security law has not fully incorporated privacy law’s evolving recognition about designing to accommodate human behavior and protecting
human values beyond confidentiality. To make matters worse, the
protections in privacy law often fall short in ways that are bad for data
security.
The fact that data security is often part of the fabric of privacy law is a
missed opportunity. Lawmakers could draw from privacy law’s toolbox to
bring a richer and more nuanced approach to securing personal data. Yet
so far, they have not.
In this book, we hope to bring data security law out of this “no man’s
land” to better reflect the overlapping wisdom of privacy and cybersecurity.
Because we focus mainly on personal data, we largely leave to others more
general critical cybersecurity issues such as infrastructure security, industrial espionage, cyberwarfare, computer crime, trade secrets and proprietary data, and the nuanced debates surrounding the market for and
disclosure of security vulnerabilities.29 Of course, these issues overlap with
data security problems.30 But in this book we are examining the data security piece of the pie.
We also are not seeking to critique the established strategies technologists
have developed to protect information. Nor are we proposing new technological approaches to the field of cybersecurity. Rather, as legal scholars,
we are drawing from existing security knowledge that the law often fails
to embrace. Because we are not technology experts, we will not delve
too deeply into technical specifics of data security. Instead, our goal is to
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develop principles and theories that can guide the law for the foreseeable
future. In this book, we propose a general approach lawmakers and judges
can take to improve the security of personal data, and we outline a broad
set of principles to bring coherence and consistency to a body of law that
for too long has been focusing in the wrong direction.
Our argument is built around one overarching point: To improve the
rules for securing personal information, policymakers must counterintuitively shift the law’s focus beyond data breaches. Too much of the
current law of data security places the breach at the center of everything.
Turning data security law into the “law of breaches” has the effect of over-
emphasizing the conduct of the breached entities while ignoring the other
actors and factors that contributed to the breach. We present an alternative, broader vision of data security policy in three areas: accountability,
redress, and technological design.
It is tempting to say to organizations: “Come on, just be more secure!”
But data security is notoriously complicated and needs a great deal of calibration. Ironically, some attempts by lawmakers and industry to add more
security can actually make systems more vulnerable.31 Security measures
come with difficult costs and tradeoffs, so the choice of which ones to use
and how many is quite challenging.
Data security is a delicate dance between technology and people. The
ideal amount of data security is not necessarily to be as secure as possible
and avoid a breach at all costs. In most cases, it is a poor policy choice
for an organization to have the strongest possible security because the
tradeoffs are too significant. It is easy to underappreciate the costs of many
security measures because costs are often thought of in monetary terms.
But the biggest costs of many security measures are that they can reduce
functionality, make things inefficient and inconvenient, and be difficult
and time-consuming.
One of the challenges with data security is that there are no absolute
answers, as we are dealing with a continuum of risk and an ongoing cat-
and-mouse game between attackers and defenders. Policy choices depend
upon not only an assessment of risk but also an assessment of the costs of
addressing those risks. A complicated balancing must take place.
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Current data security rules fail to address risk effectively. In many
circumstances, the law penalizes breaches with little regard to considerations of risk and balance. Other times, the law levies no penalty against
organizations even though their actions created enormous unwarranted risks.
We contend that there is a better role for law to play. The main lesson of
this book is that time and again, data security law and policy are missing
the bigger picture. Lawmakers should move beyond the reactionary
“blaming the breached” and hold accountable all the actors in the data
ecosystem that contribute to the problem. They should break down the
silos between privacy and security. They should promote human-centric
security that accounts for the way people actually think and act.
Part I of this book focuses on the challenges to data security and why
the law is not adequately addressing these challenges.
In Chapter 2, we provide a brief history of data security in this century.
We discuss how and why data breaches started to capture news media
headlines. In our brief sweep through the past two decades, we cover the
most historic breaches and the new security threats that emerged. When
looking at the big picture, the war against data breaches is being lost,
one battle at a time. There is a lot to learn from data breach stories; there
are common plot lines that clearly show us why data security is so often
failing.
In Chapter 3, we survey the law and policy of data security and analyze its strengths and weaknesses. We conclude that despite some small
successes, law and policy are generally failing to combat the data security
threats we face. Data security law is too reactionary. The law often merely
increases the cost of data breaches but fails to do enough to prevent them.
Moreover, the law has failed to protect individuals who are being put at
greater risk by inadequate data security.
In Part II of this book, we propose a different approach to data security
that we call “holistic data security.” Under this approach, the law would
apply earlier, more frequently, to more actors, and to more activity.
In Chapter 4, we introduce our approach, holistic data security, which
focuses on the mitigation of risk in an entire data ecosystem. Instead of
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concentrating solely on individualized harm and specific breaches, data
security law should aim to ensure the wellbeing and resilience of the data
ecosystem. Our approach draws insights from fields that focus on entire systems, such as public health.32 Both data security and public health
rules seek to keep a complex and dynamic system safe and thriving. Both
frameworks address complex, opaque, and ever-shifting risks that make
attributing causation and effective enforcement at the individual level difficult. Both fields are tasked with mitigating the spread of “viruses.” Yet
public health law seeks to sustain the health of an entire population by
mandating practices that reduce risk across the board.33 Meanwhile, data
security law struggles to look beyond the place where a virus took hold,
addressing only the last links in the chain.
In Chapter 5, we contend that lawmakers and courts can better distribute responsibility among all the different actors who play a role in
the problem of data security even if they are not proximate to an actual
breach. Data breaches are not just caused by the particular organizations
that have the breach. Breaches are the product of many actors—it takes a
village to create a breach. We provide a survey of these various actors and
their contributions to the problem.
Unfortunately, the law doesn’t hold most of the actors accountable.
Policymakers often focus rather myopically on the particular organizations being breached, and they often overlook the fact that data security is
a systemic problem.
In Chapter 6, we argue that policymakers also often fail to address
practices by other organizations that increase the harm of data breaches
to people as well as increase the costs. We can’t eliminate all breaches, but
we can significantly reduce the harm that they cause.
In Chapter 7, we address the relationship between privacy and security. Privacy is a key and underappreciated aspect of data security.
Right now, there is a schism between privacy and security in companies.
Privacy functions are commonly addressed by the compliance and legal
departments, while security is handled by the information technology
department. The two areas are commonly split apart and rarely speak to
each other.
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We should bridge data security and privacy and make them go hand-
in-hand in both law and policy. Strong privacy rules help create accountability for the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information
and can reduce vulnerabilities and risk by minimizing the use and retention of personal information. Good privacy strengthens security.
In Chapter 8, we argue that although most failures in data security involve human error, policymakers are not designing security measures
with humans in mind. Instead, humans are expected to do things that
are beyond the bounds of normal cognition. Far too little emphasis and
resources are given to educating people about their role in data security.
The result is that policymakers have failed to address the greatest security
vulnerability—the human factor.
Consider again the Target breach. On a checklist, Target looked
healthy—it had good policies, a large security team, significant resources,
and strong security software. Spending millions of dollars and installing
high-tech software still couldn’t prevent human blunders. Humans turned
off the software. Humans ignored the blinking red lights. A human clicked
on the wrong link.
Rethinking law with humans at the center is not just a simple rethink—
it goes to the very core of our law and policy regarding data security. It
means that many of our existing policies are flawed and that a number of
commonly accepted good security practices are, in fact, bad.
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In this book, we are calling for policymakers to take a new direction, a
fundamental shift in focus. Along the way, we suggest some specific things
that the law should require, but we are not aiming to provide a laundry list
of particular measures. Our focus is on the big picture. We propose a different way of thinking about data security, and we set forth our vision for
how the law can take a different approach.
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